Charles H. Miller Lecture -- Lawyers and Their Public Responsibilities by Ehrlich, Thomas
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1979
Charles H. Miller Lecture -- Lawyers and Their
Public Responsibilities
Thomas Ehrlich
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ehrlich, Thomas, "Charles H. Miller Lecture -- Lawyers and Their Public Responsibilities" (1979). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper
1812.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1812
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 Summer 1979 Number 4
CHARLES H. MILLER LECTURE-
LAWYERS AND THEIR PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITIES
THoMAs EHRLCH*
I am delighted to have been asked to give the first Charles
H. Miller Lecture on Professional Responsibility.' This is a spe-
cial privilege because of the excellence of the University of Ten-
nessee and its School of Law, and particularly because of the man
whom we honor today-Charles H. Miller.
Long before clinical legal education became fashionable,
Professor Miller had a vision of what could be done to help stu-
dents learn to grapple with complex legal concerns in an environ-
ment that includes real people and their real problems as well as
rigorous academic standards. He saw the dangers and the weak-
nesses of abstracting legal issues from the real-life situations in
which they arise, and he expanded the bounds of legal training
in response. All of us who care about legal education and the legal
profession are deeply in his debt, and I am grateful for this oppor-
tunity to join in the first annual celebration of his unique contri-
butions.My focus, of course, is the professional responsibilities of
lawyers. I should state at the outset that I am a member of an
* Director, International Development Cooperation Agency; former Presi-
dent, Legal Services Corporation; former Dean, Stanford Law School. This
paper was delivered as the first Charles H. Miller Lecture at the University of
Tennessee College of Law on October 25, 1978. My special thanks are due to
Alice Daniel, General Counsel of the Legal Services Corporation, who suggested
a number of the concepts in this paper and collaborated in developing them.
Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School was also of great assistance in
raising some of the issues reflected here.
1. Professor Emeritus Charles H. Miller founded the University of Tennes-
see Legal Clinic in 1947 and served as its director until his retirement in 1975.
The new bienniel lecture series, established to honor Professor Miller was en-
dowed by contributions from his friends and colleagues.
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American Bar Association Commission established to develop a
new code of professional responsibility, and none of my remarks
today should be interpreted as indicating views other than my
own. Further, if I have learned anything over the past two de-
cades as a lawyer, it is that my views are constantly changing.
You should not, therefore, take my thoughts as more than tenta-
tive reactions to difficult problems.
Some have suggested that the current Code of Professional
Responsibility should be declared void for vagueness. They com-
plain that it provides no guidance on scores of the hardest ques-
tions faced by lawyers in their everyday practice.
Let me tell a true story, told to me by Professor Barbara
Babcock, as one example. Imagine that you are a lawyer in a
public defender's office in a large urban area. You have been
assigned to defend a man accused of robbing a small variety store.
The sole witness to the robbery, the storeowner, identified your
client in a police line-up. A few days before the trial is to begin
you go to check the recollections of the storeowner; you find that
the store has closed and that the owner has left no forwarding
address. After pondering the situation for a time, you go to the
local Post Office and find a new address for the owner. You show
the owner a picture of your client, and he reaffirms that your
client robbed his store.
The night before the trial is to begin, however, an Assistant
District Attorney calls you to say that in all likelihood the case
against your client will be dismissed because the District Attor-
ney's office has been unable to locate the storeowner-the only
witness to the robbery. Question: Should you tell the prosecutor
the whereabouts of the witness? Over the course of a long night,
you and your colleagues in the public defender's office debate the
issue and finally reach a judgment.
I use the tale simply to illustrate how little guidance is given
by the current Code of Professional Responsibility on a number
of tough problems.' Most of them are in two broad catego-
2. With respect to contact with witnesses, the Code of Professional Re.
sponsibility directs that "(a] lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he
or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce." ABA CoDE or POuS-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as CoDs], Disciplinary Rule
Ihereinafter cited as DR] 7-109(A) (1975), and that "(a] lawyer shall not
advise or cause a person to secrete himself . . .for the purpose of making
himself unavailable as a witness ... ." id. DR 7-109(B). Ethical Consideration
[hereinafter cited as EC] 7-23 suggests disclosure to the judge of adverse law
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ries-issues concerning disclosure of matters adverse to a client
on one hand3 and conflicts of interest on the other.4
Remember, however, that the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is not designed merely to give guidance. It establishes en-
forceable rules,' and violations of those rules lead to sanc-
if the opposing counsel has not discovered it, see ABA OPINION No. 280 (1949),
but the rule is generally viewed as not extending to disclosure of adverse facts.
. See Brosnahan & Brosnshan, The Attorney's Ethical Conduct During Adversary
Proceedings, PROFSSIONAL RESPONSIBILMY: A GtiDE FOR ArroRNEYs 165 (1978).
Further, "a lawyer shall not knowingly ...[rieveal a confidence or secret of
his client." CODE, supra, DR 4-101(B).
All requirements and ethical considerations are qualified by the general rule
that defines misconduct. "A lawyer shall not . . . [c]ircumvent a Disciplinary
Rule through actions of another [or] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice." Id. DR 1-102(A).
3. For rules concerning disclosure, see CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101 (pres-
ervation of confidences and secrets of a client); id. DR 7-102(A)(3) (revelation
when required by law) id. DR 7-102(B)(1) (revelation of client's fraud upon the
court except when privileged); id. DR 7-106(B)(2) (revelation of client's or em-
ployer's identity unless privileged or irrelevant); id. EC 4-1 (obligation to hold
confidences and secrets inviolate); id. EC 4-2 (permissible disclosures); id. EC
4-3 (permissible disclosures); id. EC 4-4 (obligation to advise client of attorney-
client evidentiary privilege); id. EC 4-5 (obligation not to use confidential infor-
mation and to prevent misuse by others); id. EC 4-6 (continuation of obligation
not to reveal after termination of relationship).
4. For rules concerning conflicts of interests, see id. DR 5-101 "Refusing
Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent
Professional Judgment"; id. DR 5-102 "Withdrawal as Counsel When the Law-
yer Becomes a Witness"; id. DR 5-103 "Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in
Litigation"; id. DR 5-104 "Limiting Business Relations with a Client"; id. DR
5-105 "Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another
Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer"; id.
DR 5-106 "Settling Similar Claims of Clients"; id. DR 5-107 "Avoiding Influ-
ence by Others than the Client"; id. DR 8-101 "Action as a Public Official";
id. DR 9-101 "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety"; id. EC 5-14 to
5-20 "Interests of Multiple Clients."
5. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the
lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Discipli-
nary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the
nature of their professional activities.
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tions-censure, suspension, and sometimes even disbarment.
Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that some matters are left
to the individual lawyer's conscience.
What ethical issues are so basic to the lawyer's role in our
society, however, that wrong judgments on those issues-or wrong
actions involving them-should invoke sanctions? In other words,
what ethical imperatives are necessarily implied by the very sta-
tus of being a lawyer?
Lawyers, of course, have a monopoly on the delivery of legal
services. It is unlawful by statute in many states to provide legal
counsel unless you are a lawyer,' and judicial rules in other states
preclude so-called unauthorized practice of law. Why is this? If
the lawyer is just a hired gun, the tough guy in the adversary
process, why not allow lay representation? Is it that laymen will
not be familiar with the legal process-that they will not play by
the rules? If so, it would seem reasonable to narrow unauthorized
practice rules and allow lay advocacy at least until it runs afoul
of the legal process.
Is it a matter of competency? Of adequate representation of
a party? Why then is an individual allowed to represent herself
or himself?7 Further, once a lawyer is admitted to the bar, there
CODE, supra note 2, Preliminary Statement (footnotes omitted).
The Code derives its legal force, however, from the effect given to it by
disciplinary bodies in the various states. . . . The new Code. . . has
been formally adopted in all states and the District of Columbia, albeit
with a variety of omissions and alterations, sometimes substantial, that
must be examined with respect to any particular jurisdiction.
A. KAUFMAN, PRoBLEMs ni P O EssioAL RspoNssaTLrrY 29 (1976).
6. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303 (Cum. Supp. 1978): "No person
shall engage in the 'practice of law' . . unless he shall have been duly licensed
therefore, and while his license therefore is in full force and effect ....
7. E.g., U.S.C. § 1654 (1977) ("In all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
cases therein."); TENN. CoD ANN. § 29-109 (1955) ("Any person may conduct
and manage his own case in any court of this state."). See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), in which the Court held that "a defendant in a state
criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so," id. at 807 (emphasis in original);
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946), in which the Court held that self-
representation is implicit in the sixth amendment right to defense and to assis-
tance of counsel; and, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942), in which the Court said that the sixth amendment right to counsel
[Vol. 46
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is generally no control or review of competency short of the
grossest kind of malpractice. Apart from Martindale-Hub bell
there is usually only word-of-mouth among lawyers, and neither
could be called a discriminating guide.
Obviously, concerns about the adverse impact of unauthor-
ized practice and about competency are part of the basis for the
lawyers' monopoly of the provision of legal services. But the heart
of the matter, in my view, is this: lawyers have that monopoly
because they are an integral part of the justice system. As officers
of the court, they are a key component of the justice system as
are courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures. It follows, I
believe, that with the lawyers' monopoly come substantial obliga-
tions to that system.
Our justice system is one that the residents of this country
have no choice about. They must use it. They must live under the
law. Society as a whole, through government, requires that com-
mitment of everyone. In turn, it seems to me, the opportunity to
use the legal system is an inherent right of citizenship. If political
liberty means anything at all, it must mean that. For the vast
majority of people, this right, this aspect of liberty, can be real-
ized only with access to a lawyer. Lawyers make the justice sys-
tem work; they are a vital component of the system.
This rationale for the lawyers' monopoly seems frequently
overlooked. Most of our legal tradition and rhetoric emphasizes
the lawyer's role in the adversary system rather than in the justice
system. The current Code of Professional Responsibility retains
that focus. The Code makes defense of the paying client against
an adversary in a private dispute the starting place for consider-
ing almost any ethical issue. It assumes that since the lawyer
would not be involved in a matter without the client, the client
is key.' The role of a court is to resolve the dispute before it, and
that resolution can best be achieved if each lawyer represents his
or her client with utmost zeal.
includes a "correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help .... [T]he Con-
stitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," id. at 279.
8. "The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his member-
ship in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to
secure and protect available legal rights and benefits." CODE, supra note 2, EC
7-1.
9. Canon 7 of the CODE, supra note 2, requires that "a lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
1979]
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In my view, this is a mistaken overemphasis on the adversary
aspects of the justice sytem. Remember, a courtroom is a substi-
tute for jousting, not itself a battlefield.'0 At the very least, the
tension between the lawyer's duty to the client and his duty to
the justice system needs to be more clearly acknowledged in any
new code. By focusing almost exclusively on the relationship be-
tween a lawyer and a paying client in a courtroom context, the
current Code fails to deal with many of the most difficult prob-
lems.
Two interrelated developments in the justice system inten-
sify this failing. The first is that the two-party dispute before a
court involving a private transaction is no longer the prototype
of the lawyer's task-if, indeed, it ever was. Most evident, much
of what most lawyers do is outside any tribunal. They give advice
and counsel on how best to design arrangements furthering their
clients' interests. They are, in essence, private lawmakers. Fur-
ther, the individual lawyer often assumes the role of intermediary
between individuals or groups and acts quite apart from any for-
mal institutional setting. She or he may help several parties to a
prospective arrangement work out the details of that arrange-
ment so that it serves all their interests, while recognizing that
those interests are far from identical. A code built solely around
an adversary system is inadequate to cover the range of those
responsibilities.
Even when a tribunal is the forum for a lawyer's efforts, it is
less often a court than one of a variety of other lawmaking institu-
tions. The adversary process, in the classic sense, is rarely in-
volved.
This is most obvious when the appearance is before a legisla-
ture. Legislative bodies seek to provide democratic resolution of
complex political issues. Is it adequate to say that the lawyer's
ethical responsibilities in such situations are no different from
those in the courtroom? Legislative hearings are designed to help
shape public policy. Do private lawyers at those hearings have
any special obligations, particularly when only a limited range of
interests is represented?
10. "The adversary system has deep roots in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. Its antecedent is often said to be the Norman trial by battle, wherein
issues in doubt were resolved by the outcome of a duel." G. HAZARD, ETHics IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAw 120 (1978).
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When a lawyer is involved in an administrative proceeding,
the situation may be equally far removed from the prototype two-
party private dispute before a court. The role of many adminis-
trative agencies in their procedures is to protect a variety of pub-
lic interests. A number of those agencies have concluded that
private lawyers must help to provide this protection, even when
their clients' interests are adversely affected. The recent efforts
by the Securities and Exchange Commission to require private
lawyers to reveal misdealings by their clients are a prime exam-
ple.2 ' Lawyers must, says the SEC, blow the whistle on their
clients.
Even in judicial proceedings, it is no longer possible to view
a two-party dispute involving a private transaction as the norm.
The federal courts in particular are increasingly at centerstage in
the resolution of basic social policies. Whether one views the
trend as wise or otherwise, it is a reality, as Professor Abram
Chayes of Harvard has explored at some length. 12
What do these developments mean for the lawyer's ethical
responsibilities? I am by no means sure of all the implications,
but I am clear that it is no longer satisfactory, if it ever was, to
view the lawyer's role solely in terms of the adversary process and
the zealous representation of a client's interests.
The problem is also intensified because of shifts in the roles
of lawyers in relation to their clients. In the traditional litigation
context, the lawyer may have to make a variety of tactical judg-
ments concerning various courses of action. But the basic deci-
sions are made by the client, and the lawyer's role is to advance
the interests of that client.'2 The lawyer is seen as one with exper-
tise in making the adversary system work.
Under this approach, the client is assumed to be fully able
to define his or her best interests and to communicate those inter-
ests to the lawyer. The role of the Code of Professional Responsi-
11. See Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the
Bar of the SEC, 24 EMoRY L.J. 747 (1975); Johnson, The Dynamics of SEC Rule
2(e): A Crisis for the Bar, 1975 UTAH L. Rev. 629.
12. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281 (1976).
13. See CODs, supra note 2, EC 7-7: [Except in certain areas that do not
affect the merits or prejudice the rights of the client] "the authority to make
decisions is exclusively that of the client and . . . such decisionn are binding
on his lawyer."
19791
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bility is primarily to ensure that the lawyer does not use personal
expertise to further personal ends or to disadvantage a client.' At
the same time, of course, absent malpractice the lawyer is re-
lieved from any responsibility for the substantive outcome of a
matter.'5
This traditional relationship between client and attorney
does not fit many lawyering situations today. The point is most
obvious in terms of public-interest law firms that are organized
to further particular public causes-some by environmental
groups, some by business organizations, some around other
causes. These firms generally have a wide range of potential cases
within their fields of interest, and the choice of which matters to
pursue is usually made in terms of fundamental long-term goals."
The key issue is often which potential plaintiffs case will
best further those goals. Once that decision is made, the firm can
easily attract willing clients. As a result, the ordinary client-
lawyer relationship is inevitably altered.
This approach is obviously not without problems. As every
law student knows, courts bound by article Ill of the United
States Constitution are prohibited from giving advisory opin-
ions. 7 The law requires that there be a real case or controversy,
and the rule that every litigant must have "standing" is one of
the ways to ensure that this requirement is met.'" The Supreme
14. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-1, which provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compro-
mising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the in-
terests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons, should be per-
mitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
15. ABA INFoRmAL OPINION No. 1273 (1973) indicates that "[nieglect
cannot be found if the acts or omissions complained of were . ..the result of
an error of judgment made in good faith." See CODE, supra note 2, DR 6-101(A).
16. See Bellow & Kettleson, The Mirror of Public Interest Ethics: Prob-
lems and Paradoxes, PROFESIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY: A GuIns FOR ATToRNEYS 234-
35 (1978).
17. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (Congress cannot grant
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion, since U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, requires that there be an actual case or controversy
before the Court before it can render an opinion).
18. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Rescue Army
v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
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Court has stated that even when organizations such as the Sierra
Club are involved, the normal rules of standing apply and such
institutions must establish their own unique relationship to the
situation at issue; otherwise, the case will be dismissed for lack
of standing."
The Supreme Court has also, without indicating any possible
inconsistency, recognized the special nature of public-interest
lawyers and their footing, if not their standing, in the courts. In
Re Primus,2 ' for example, made clear that the first amendment
prohibits application of solicitation rules against an organi-
zation that seeks a client not to obtain private gain but to ad-
vance a political purpose. In other words, such an organization
may seek out a client as a means to force a court to decide an issue
that otherwise would not come before it.
One may ask why it should be necessary to have a client at
all, if it is the cause for which the organization is established that
is to be furthered. But my point here is that when an ideology of
an institutional law firm, rather than the interests of an individ-
ual client, is dominant, the responsibilities of lawyers working for
the institution are obviously different, and some effort to think
through the ethical implications of the differences is necessary in
preparing a new code.
In many matters brought by public-interest firms, of course,
individual or group plaintiffs play significant roles in the develop-
ment of litigation. The firms' boards of directors and sponsoring
organizations may also have an important voice in decisions. But
the litigation is often conceived and carried out with relatively
little involvement by the clients and, more basically, without the
constraints of particular clients' interests at stake.
A monetary or other settlement offer late in the litigation
process, for example, may be extremely attractive to an individ-
ual party but not to the public-interest firm that represents the
party. School desegregation cases are one example. May the firm
ethically require the party to agree in advance not to accept such
a settlement, as a condition to taking the case?2
Some have argued that these problems are a reason for op-
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
20. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
21. See, e.g, Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
1979]
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posing public-interest law firms.2 My own view is quite the re-
verse. Once it is recognized that courts, like legislatures and ad-
ministrative agencies, are inevitably instruments of social
change, it should not make "a fundamental difference that the
motive force of the process is a lawyer rather than a layman,""
as Professor Chayes has stressed. There is a more basic point, as
Professor Chayes has also suggested. The question "who is the
client?" is difficult to answer in a wide range of situations, seem-
ingly far removed from public-interest litigation. The problem is
not simply a quirk in the justice system that results from founda-
tions funding public-interst law firms around the country. The
same basic problems arise over and over again in the general
counsel's office of every government agency, and in private com-
panies as well. Professor Geoffrey Hazard chronicles many of
them in his new book on legal ethics in representing large com-
mercial organizations. 4
Assume, for example, you are counsel for a major corporation
and discover evidence of possible illegal conduct by the president
of the company. What do you do? And when you do it, are you
acting as counsel for the company president, the other officers,
the board of directors, the present stockholders, the future stock-
holders, or some or all of those groups? In fact, their interests
often conflict sharply, and no easy resolution of those conflicts
will be possible. One SEC official has suggested that corporation
counsel should be hired by a committee representing the various
interests involved in a corporation-stockholders, directors, offi-
cers, and others. Under this approach, counsel for a corporation
could take positions at odds with that of any one of those inter-
ests. This procedural approach has much to recommend it. But
in the interim, the question "who's the client?" remains.
The problems of a code premised on the lawyer as part of an
adversary system instead of the lawyer as part of a justice system
are multiplied when we look at the extraordinary range of respon-
22. For conflicting assessments of the value of public interest law firms,
see Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law:
Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 G-o. L.J. 1095
(1971) and Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 Ann. L. REv.
805 (1971).
23. Lecture by Professor Abram Chayes at Georgetown University Law
School in 1978 (unpublished).
24. G. HAZARIn, supra note 10.
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sibilities that lawyers assume. Lawyers are everywhere-to the
consternation of many outside the bar. Should a new code apply
to their activities whatever the context, or only when they are
acting in some dominantly lawyering role?
What of the lawyer-administrator, for example? Most people
would agree that the felons in the Nixon Administration were
properly precluded from further law practice, but how far should
the principle behind that judgment be carried? Once a lawyer,
always a lawyer? Or should the reach of the code be limited to
the work of lawyers acting as lawyers, except only if they actually
violate the law by a crime involving moral turpitude? Should an
administrator who is also a lawyer, for example, be subject to bar
discipline for failing to carry out his or her administrative respon-
sibilities when those responsibilities do not require membership
in the legal profession? These are among the hard questions we
are wrestling with in the ABA Commission charged with produc-
ing a new code.
Only when we shift to the individual client does the tradi-
tional lawyer-client relationship in an adversary context seem to
have some semblance of utility. And, in terms of the total number
of lawyers and their legal work, the share here involved is a rela-
tively small one. Even in this situation, the picture is clouded.
The clouds are obvious when the competency of the client is
limited; a child or someone in a mental institution is an example.
Some special problems also exist for legal services lawyers who
are paid with public funds. A private client decides whether the
potential benefit of a favorable outcome is great enough to war-
rant the cost of carrying a case forward at any particular point.
But for legal services clients, like the clients of the public-interest
lawyer, generally no costs are involved. For the public-interest
lawyer, the issue usually is whether the benefits from a particular
case are outweighed by its costs, in terms of the cause that is
being pursued by the firm." Although as a formality the consent
of the client is required, as a practical matter the lawyer can end
a matter if he or she decides that the benefits in a particular case
are offset by the costs.
A legal services lawyer faces a more difficult problem. If the
25. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 16, at 224-37.
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will of the client is to prevail, as it does with the private lawyer,
the client will almost always want to proceed since nothing is at
risk. Is the legal services lawyer entitled to weigh the possible
benefits to the clients against the costs that may result to other
,potential legal services clients who cannot be served?
This is only one of scores of matters for which the current
Code of Professional Responsibility provides no answers. It fails
to provide answers, I suggest, because the situation at issue was
simply not considered by the drafters of the Code who made the
lawyer in the adversary setting the focus of ethical attention.
Even when a single, fee-paying client is involved, of course,
serious ethical issues may arise, and many are not covered by the
current Code. Assume, for example, that your client is involved
in a complex business proceeding in which the tax consequences
of the transaction are paramount. You advise the client that in
your judgment, the course of action that she is planning would
violate the tax laws. Your client then asks about the likelihood
of getting caught. May you ethically respond, giving your own
judgment based on your own experience? Or are you, as an officer
of the court, charged with promoting solely law enforcement and
not law evasion? What if your client is a trucking company that
seeks your help concerning the purchase of CB's for all the com-
pany trucks, with the apparent purpose of ensuring that its driv-
ers violate the speeding laws only when there is little likelihood
that they will be caught? What are your ethical responsibilities?
These and scores of other tough issues are unclear under the
present Code. I am by no means certain that the new ABA Com-
mission will do better. I am, however, clear about one point,
although it may not be covered in any code. Countless lawyers, I
believe, engage in conduct on behalf of their clients that they
would never countenance on behalf of themselves.2' "I am only
doing my client's bidding," they say. "That is what lawyering in
the adversary system is all about." In my view, that approach is
totally wrong-a dangerous consequence of the focus on the law-
yer's role in the adversary system rather than in the justice sys-
tem. It is dangerous to the legal profession, and, most of all,
dangerous to the public.
26. Compare Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STA. L. Rv. 3 (1951) with
Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The Ethics of Advocacy," 4 STAN. L.
REv. 349 (1952).
[Vol. 46
CHARLES H. MILLER LECTURE
Until now I have been considering the professional responsi-
bilities of lawyers when they have agreed to provide representa-
tion on the basis of an individually negotiated fee for a private
client or a salary from a public source. But there is an equally
important cluster of professional responsibilities; it also arises
from the role of the lawyer as part of the justice system. These
responsibilities concern the provision of representation to the oth-
erwise unrepresented.
For some time, I have been urging upon the organized (and
disorganized) bar the idea that lawyers have an obligation to
provide some of their time and talents pro bono publico. This
claim can be based on Canon Two of the current Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer should "assist
the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available." But I admit the Code now sets no standards for how
a lawyer should meet that responsibility or what happens if she
or he fails to do so."
My convictions about this responsibility of lawyers are
rooted in my view that every lawyer is part of the justice system
with an obligation to help make that system work. We have a
monopoly of legal services, and with the monopoly comes an obli-
gation to serve the public. In my view, the operational conse-
quences of that obligation are a requirement to provide some
representation to those who would be otherwise unrepresented.
Equally important, society as a whole has an interest in the
sound workings of the legal system. Society as a whole has an
interest in ensuring that the law is followed by all persons and
entities, regardless of their economic resources. If this does not
happen-if some people, including those in government, are
effectively outside the law because others do not have the eco-
nomic resources to bring them to account-then the whole system
is skewed.
These are the reasons why the legal profession has an obliga-
tion to ensure that legal services for the poor are available. These
are the reasons why legal services are different from other neces-
sary services provided by government-services for which one
might argue that the poor should be able to take the equivalent
value in cash.
27. Although the CODE suggests that lawyers should support efforts to
provide legal services to persons unable to pay, CODE, supra note 2, EC 2-16, no
Disciplinary Rule makes that obligation mandatory.
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Much more federal funding is needed for legal assistance to
the poor. It is my hope and expectation that over future years
that funding will increase substantially. Legal assistance will
never be available to all who need it, however, unless private
lawyers provide some of their time and talents pro bono to that
end. Many do so now, but a minimum amount of pro bono service
is needed from all private lawyers.
In my own view, unless private lawyers take the lead-and
it is a moral lead that is required-the government will do it for
us. Lawyers are part of the justice system, not merely the adver-
sary system. Their roles in the justice system require, above all,
a sensitivity to the needs of our citizenry, who must live under
that system.
This, I believe, was Charles H. Miller's message and his
aim when he led in establishing clinical legal education here.
He deserves our deep gratitude for the lasting monument that he
has created for generations of law students at this school, and for
the public they serve so well.
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